Ethiopia’s latest escalation in Tigray is not a new conflict so much as an old political crisis returning in a different form.
The seizure of airports in Mekelle, Axum and Shire by Tigrayan forces on September 23, 2026, and the suspension of flights by Ethiopian Airlines have once again placed northern Ethiopia at the centre of regional security concerns. The African Union has called for immediate de-escalation and a return to direct talks under the 2022 Pretoria Agreement.
Understanding where Ethiopia goes from here requires looking beyond the latest battlefield developments. The roots of the crisis stretch back decades, through Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism, the political dominance of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the rise of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the 2020 war and a peace agreement that stopped the fighting without fully resolving the political disputes that caused it.
The central lesson is uncomfortable: ending a war is not the same as resolving the conditions that make another war possible.
From TPLF dominance to political transition
For much of the period between 1991 and 2018, the TPLF was the dominant force within Ethiopia’s ruling coalition, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front.
Under the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia experienced significant economic development and strengthened its international standing. But the political system also generated deep grievances among other communities, particularly over representation, political power and the distribution of authority between the federal government and Ethiopia’s regions.
By 2018, sustained protests, particularly among Oromo communities, had produced a political transition. Abiy Ahmed became prime minister, promising political reform and reconciliation.
His early years in office produced major changes. Political prisoners were released, opposition groups were allowed greater space and Ethiopia reached a rapprochement with Eritrea after nearly two decades of hostility. Abiy received the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize for his role in the peace process with Eritrea.
But the political transition also fundamentally changed the balance of power.
Abiy moved to dissolve the EPRDF and create the Prosperity Party. The TPLF refused to join the new party, becoming increasingly separated from the federal political centre.
The relationship deteriorated further when Ethiopia postponed national elections because of the Covid-19 pandemic. The TPLF rejected the extension of the federal government’s mandate and organised regional elections in Tigray despite Addis Ababa’s opposition.
The political disagreement eventually became a military confrontation.
The 2020 war
On November 4, 2020, Abiy’s government accused Tigrayan forces of attacking a federal military base in Tigray. The government launched a military operation that quickly developed into a full-scale war.
The conflict was not confined to Ethiopia’s federal army and the Tigray Defence Forces. Eritrean forces entered the conflict alongside Ethiopian federal forces, while Amhara forces became involved in fighting in areas bordering Tigray.
The war rapidly became one of Africa’s most devastating conflicts of the modern era.
Fighting spread beyond Tigray into Amhara and Afar. Reports of massacres, sexual violence, starvation and other serious human rights violations emerged from the conflict, while millions were displaced.
The economic consequences were also severe. Resources were redirected towards the war while infrastructure, businesses and public services were destroyed. Chatham House described the conflict as placing a significant strain on government finances and worsening Ethiopia’s broader economic difficulties.
But the military balance eventually changed.
Tigrayan forces recaptured Mekelle and advanced southwards in 2021, at one point threatening routes towards Addis Ababa. Federal forces and their allies later regained territory, and by 2022 both sides had strong incentives to end the conflict.
That produced the Pretoria peace agreement.
The Pretoria Agreement stopped the war — but left difficult questions unanswered
The November 2022 agreement was a major diplomatic achievement.
Brokered under the African Union’s peace process, it established a permanent cessation of hostilities, provided for disarmament and the restoration of services, and created a framework for humanitarian access and political reconciliation.
The guns largely fell silent.
But the agreement was primarily a cessation-of-hostilities agreement, rather than a comprehensive settlement of every political dispute.
That distinction has become critical.
Research by the Rift Valley Institute argues that the agreement halted large-scale fighting but postponed several of the underlying disputes, including contested territories, the return of displaced people and the political future of Tigray.
Western Tigray remained particularly contentious. Amhara forces retained control of disputed areas, while many displaced Tigrayans could not return home.
The question of Eritrean forces also remained unresolved.
Meanwhile, the political relationship between the TPLF and Addis Ababa continued to deteriorate.
How peace began to unravel
The post-war period produced another layer of conflict: a struggle within Tigray itself.
An interim regional administration was established in 2023, but divisions emerged between factions favouring closer cooperation with Addis Ababa and TPLF hardliners.
Getachew Reda, who had become a prominent figure in the interim administration, was removed in 2025 and replaced by Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede. In May 2026, the Tigray regional council was reinstated and elected TPLF chairman Debretsion Gebremichael as president. The federal government did not recognise the new administration.
The political dispute increasingly acquired a military dimension.
According to the International Crisis Group and other analysts, tensions over territorial control, political legitimacy and security arrangements were accompanied by renewed mobilisation.
By early 2026, clashes had again been reported between Tigrayan forces and federal forces.
That brings Ethiopia to the present crisis.
Why the latest escalation is different
The danger today is not simply a repeat of 2020.
The political map has changed.
During the previous war, Tigrayan forces faced a coalition involving the federal government, Eritrea and Amhara forces. Today, alliances are shifting.
The TPLF has announced an alliance with other armed groups opposed to Abiy’s government. Analysts caution that these organisations have different interests and may struggle to operate as a coherent coalition, but their alignment nevertheless demonstrates the widening political and security challenge facing Addis Ababa.
The fighting has also again touched neighbouring Afar and Amhara areas.
That matters because a Tigray conflict becomes considerably more dangerous if it connects with Ethiopia’s other regional conflicts.
The country’s political crisis could then become a multi-front security crisis.
What Ethiopia can learn from the first war
The first lesson is that military victory does not automatically produce political stability.
The 2020-2022 war eventually ended because the parties recognised that continued fighting carried enormous costs. But unresolved political and territorial questions survived the ceasefire.
The second lesson is that peace agreements need implementation mechanisms.
The Pretoria Agreement created a framework, but some of its most politically difficult elements — including contested territories, displacement and broader political reconciliation — remained unresolved. The African Union now describes the agreement as the cornerstone of Ethiopia’s peace process and is urging the parties to return to direct talks.
The third lesson is that regional grievances cannot indefinitely be treated as security problems.
Ethiopia’s federal system was designed to accommodate a country of extraordinary ethnic, linguistic and regional diversity. When political disputes within that system become militarised, the consequences can quickly extend beyond one region.
The fourth lesson is economic.
War does not merely destroy roads, hospitals and businesses. It changes investor calculations, increases government expenditure and diverts resources from development. Ethiopia’s previous war compounded an already difficult economic environment.
The suspension of Ethiopian Airlines flights to three Tigrayan airports during the latest escalation offers an immediate illustration of how security instability can disrupt ordinary economic activity.
The lesson for Ethiopia — and Africa
Ethiopia’s experience offers a wider lesson for African governments confronting internal political competition.
A sustainable peace requires more than getting armed groups to put down their weapons. It requires political institutions capable of absorbing disputes before they become existential struggles.
That means credible dialogue, enforceable agreements, accountability for serious abuses, mechanisms for resolving territorial disputes and credible arrangements for the return of displaced communities.
It also means recognising that political legitimacy cannot be manufactured through military control alone.
The latest Tigray crisis is therefore a test of more than Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government. It is a test of Ethiopia’s political architecture.
The country has already demonstrated that it can stop a devastating war through negotiation.
The harder task is proving that it can build a political settlement strong enough to prevent the same grievances from producing another one.
For Ethiopia, that is the difference between a ceasefire and lasting peace. And for the wider Horn of Africa, the distinction could prove consequential.
